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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN A CRIMINAL CASE.
THE sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, among other things, that "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, * and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence."
The ninth section of the first article of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania declares that "in all criminal prosecutions the
accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel."
Provisions identical in language or in substance with one or the
other of these quotations are to be found in the Constitution of
every state in the Union, with the exception of Virginia.
It is our purpose to examine this right, to trace the history of
its establishment, and define its boundaries. The subject is one
of unusual interest, and appeals not only to the professional man
but to every intelligent layman who 'alues his rights as a citizen
and seeks to fully understand them. The claim of Guiteau,
recently on trial for the murder of President Garfield, though
represented by counsel, to act as his own counsel, and his extra-
ordinary behavior in the assertion and exercise of his right,
awakened a wide spread public interest in the topic and led to
many inquiries concerning it. It is not too late to discuss it.
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The rule, briefly stated, is as follows : At common law, in all
cases, whether of treason, felony or misdemeanor, and at all times,
the prisoner has had and still has the right to address the jury in
person in his own defence. In misdemeanors he always was and
still is allowed to do" this by counsel; but it is universally agreed
that at common law a prisoner, whether peer or commoner, was
not entitled to defend by counsel, upon the general issue "not
guilty" on any indictment for treason or felony: 1 Archbold's
Crim. Prac. and PI., Pomeroy's ed., 551; Weeks on Attorneys
at Law, sect. 184; 1. Chitty's Grim. Law *407; Hawkins's P. C.,
b. 2, c. 39, sect. 1; Foster's Crown Law 231; Hale's P. C. 236.
There were certain wellestablished exceptions. In appeals,
which were private rather than public prosecutions, being the
accusation of a murderer by one who had an interest in the per-
son killed, or of a felon by one of his accomplices, full counsel
were always allowed to the appellee, because although the object
sought was the death of the defendant, yet the form was that of a
civil proceeding, and all appeals were presumed to be carried on
with greater spleen and vindictiveness than indictments: 2 Haw-
kins, c. 39, sect. 3; 1 Chitty Grim. Law *410; 17 State Trials
(Howell's ed.) 430; 8 Id. 726.
The prohibition of the assistance of counsel applied only to
matters qf fact, as the court assigned counsel to argue a doubtful
point of law arising at or after trial (Hale's P. C. *236) ; and upon
the trial of issues which did not turn on the question of "guilty"
or "not guilty," but upon collateral facts, as a plea of sanctuary
or a pardon, or upon the assignment of error to reverse a sentence
of outlawry, prisoners under capital charges, whether of treason or
fblony, were entitled to the assistance of counsel: Foster's Crown
Law, pp. 42, 46, 56, 232; Ratcliff's Case, 4 State Trials 47.
But these exceptions were of little practical benefit to those
ignorant of law, for it was held in all cases that the prisoner must
propose the point, and if the court think it will bear a debate they
will assign counsel to -argue it: 2 Hawkins, c. 39, sect. 4; 7 State
Tr. 1523; 8 Id. 570; 11 Id. 525. At the trial of Lord Preston
in 1661, Chief Baron ATKYNS said: "It is not the doubt of the
prisoner but the doubt of the court that will occasion the assign-
ment of counsel :" 12 State Trials 659, 660.
1Upon the trial of Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, in 1571,
for treason in supporting the right of Mary Queen of Scots to the
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British throne, he made a vain appeal to the court for counsel
even upon questions of law: 1 State Trials 965. "I have," he
said, "had very short warning to provide answer to so great a
matter. I have not had fourteen hours in all both day and night;
and now I neither hear the same statute alleged, and yet I am put
at once to the whole herd of laws, not knowing 'which particularly
to answer unto. The indictment containeth sundry points and mat-
ters to touch me by circumstance, and so to draw me into the
matter of treason which are not treasons themselves; therefore
with reverence and humble submission I am led to think I may
have counsel, and this I show, that you may think I move not this
suit without any ground. I am hardly handled. I have had short
warning and no books." Chief Justice DYER refused the request
by answering that counsel could not be allowed in point of
treason.
Sir Henry Vane, on his trial for high treason, raised most
important questions of law, and prayed to have counsel assigned
to speak to them. The application was refused on the ground
that the same points had been decided on the trials of the regi-
cides: 6 State Trials 183, A. D. 1662.
During the trial of Sidney application was made by him for
counsel when he contended that conspiracy to levy war was not trea-
son, and when he objected that some of the jury were not fiee-
holders of the county in which the venue of the indictment was
laid, and he was answered by Chief Justice JFFREYS "If you
assign us any particular point of law, if the court think it such a
point as may be worth the debating, you shall have counsel :" 9
State Trials 834. When Bamaeld rose as amicus eurx and sug-
gested in arrest of judgment that there was a material defect in
the indictment, JEFFREYS coolly observed, "We have heard of it
already, we thank you for your friendship and are satisfied." He
then sentenced the illustrious prisoner to death. On the trial of
Colledge, Lord Chief Justice NoRTH declared, "I must tell you a
defence in case of high treason ought not to be made by artificial
cavils but by plain fact :" 8 State Trials 570.
The judges in the time of the Commonwealth were no less arbi-
trary. Their behavior towards John Lilburne on his trial as a
traitor for publishing criticisms upon the government of Cromwell,
was more decorous in tone but none the less severe than that of
Foster or Scroggs. Time and again he besought the appointment
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of counsel, and was always refused. Then bursting out with long
suppressed passion he cried: " Pray let me have fair play, and
not be wound and screwed up into hazards and snares." With a
courage unequalled by his bravest deeds in battle, he declared:
"In so extraordinary a case for me to be denied to consult with
counsel, I tell you, sir, it is most unjust and the most unrighteous
thing in my apprehension that I ever heard or saw in all my life.
0 Lord! was there ever such a pack of unjust and unrighteous
judges in the world. * * * I would rather have died in this
very court before I would have pleaded one word unto you, for
now you go about by my own ignorance and folly to make myself
guilty of caking away my own life, and therefore unless you will
permit me counsel, upon this lock I am resolved to die :" 4 State
Trials 1299. His appeal was fruitless.
An apology for this harsh feature of the rule was offered in the
maxim that the judge was counsel for the prisoner; that it was his
duty to see that the proceedings were regular, to examine witnesses
for the defendant, to advise him for his benefit, to hear his defence
with patience, and in general to take care that he was neither irreg-
ularly nor unjustly convicted. In prosecutions where counsel were
allowed, the court did not advise the prisoner. The maxim was
benevolent, but few judges ever gave the slightest heed to it in
practice.
One or two instances must suffice for illustration: Upon the
trial of Penn and Mead at the Old Bailey, for preaching to a
seditious and tumultuous assembly, the recorder put the follow-
ing question:
"What say you, 'Mr. Mead-were you there ?"
MEAD : "It is a maxim of law that no one is bound to accuse
himself, and why dost thou offer. to insnare me with such a ques-
tion ? Doth not this show thy malice ? Is this like unto a judge
that ought to be counsel for the prisoner at the bar ?"
REC. : "Sir, hold your tongue, I did not go about to insnare
you ?" 6 State Trials 958.
Upon the trial of John Crook, and other Quakers, for refusing
to take the oaths of allegiance, the following spirited dialogue is
reported:
FOSTER, C. J.: ' John Crook, when did you take the oath of
allegiance ?
CROOK: "Answering this question in the negative is to accuse
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myself, which you ought not to put me upon.' 'Nemo debet seip-
sum prodere.' I am an Englishman and I ought not to be taken,
nor imprisoned, nor called in question, nor put to answer but ac-
cording to the law of the land."
FOSTER, C. J.: "You are here required to take the oath of
allegiance, and when you have done that, you shall be heard."
CROOK: "You, that are judges on the bench, ought to be my
counsel, not my accusers."
FOSTER, C. J. : " We are here to do justice, and we are upon
our oaths to tell you what is law, not you us. Therefore, sirrah,
you are too bold."
CROOK: "Sirrah is not a word becoming a judge. If I speak
loud, it is my zeal for the truth, and for the name of the Lord.
Mine innocency makes me bold."
FOSTER, C. J..: "It is an evil zeal."
The chief justice then ordered the mouth of the prisoner to be
gagged with a "dirty cloth :" 6 State Trials 119.
The grossest violation of the maxim was the behavior of JEFFREYS
upon the trial of Lady Alice Lisle. She was more than seventy
years of age and a widow, and had given food and shelter to a dis-
senting clergyman named Hicks, who had been with the army of
Monmouth. The indictment. charged her with treason. There
was no proof whatever that she knew that the man she harbored
had ever been with the rebel army; and the jury declared that
they were not satisfied upon this point, which was the only import-
ant one in the case. The judge usurped the functions of the coun-
sel for the Crown and pressed a reluctant and conscientious witness
so hard as to "clutter him out of his .senses." Blasphemy, ribaldry
and the most horrid jests and imprecations were showered upon
him in the effort to induce him to say something that would con-
vict the prisoner. Finally, JEFFREYS extorted a verdict by arbitra-
rily declaring "there is as full proof as proof can be :" 11 State
Trials 322. He then sentenced the unhappy lady to be burned to
death, but she escaped the terrible fate of Elizabeth Gaunt, by a
commutation of the sentence into death by hanging. Upon the
scaffold she spoke these words : "I have been told the court ought
to be counsel for the prisoner; instead of which there was evi-
dence given from thence which, though it were but hearsay, might
possibly affect my jury. My defence was such as might be ex-
pected from a weak woman; but such as it was I did not hear it
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repeated to the jury: But I forgive all persons that have done me
wrong, and I desire that God will do so likewise."
The rule and the practice under it had their admirers. Ld. COKE
declared that the reason of its adoption was because the evidence
by which the prisoner was to be condemned ought to be so very
evident, and so'plain, that all the counsel in the world should not
be able to answer it: 3 Inst. 137. Sir John Davys declared that
our law doth abhor the defence and maintenance of bad causes
more than any other law in the world: Preface to Davy's Rep.
Sergeant Hawkins asserted "if it be considered that generally
every one of common understanding may as properly speak to a
matter of fhet as if he were the best lawyer, and that it requires no
manner of skill to make a plain and honest defence, which in cases
of this kind is always the best, the simplicity and innocence, artless
and ingenuous behavior of one whose conscience acquits him, hav-
ing something in it more moving and convincing than the highest
eloquence of perscns speaking in a cause not their own." 2
Hawkins, c. 39, sect. 2.
The rule did not pass unchallenged. The seeds of its dissolu-
tion, though slow in development, had been early sown. As far back
as the reign of Edward II., the author of the Mirror of Justices
had declared that ccunsel learned in the law "were more necessary
for the defence of indictments and appeals of felony than upon
other venial causes." The venerable Whitelocke assailed it in de-
bate ; Sir ROBERT ATKYNS declared it a severity, and significantly
said that he knew from experience what the maxim meant that the
judge was counsel 'or the prisoner. Even JEFR EYS declared that
it was an injustice that a man should have counsel to defend a
two-penny trespass, but that in defence of life he should have
none. (See the vary learned note to 5 State Trials 469.) The
Bloody Assizes aroused the sleeping sense of justice of the nation,
and in ten years after, the Bill for regulating Trials in Cases
of High Treason was brought forward in the House of Commons
early in February of 1695. After much opposition it became a
law, known as the 7th Win. III., c. 3. The act, among other things,
gave to a prisoner charged with high treason "the assistance of
counsel, not exceeding two, throughout his trial, to examine his
witnesses and to conduct his whole defence as well in point of fact
as upon questions of law."
Many wiseacres predicted the ruin of the state. Bishop Burnet,
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after stating that the bill had passed contrary to the hopes of those
then at the head of affairs, said, "the design of it seemed to be to
make men as safe in all treasonable practices as possible." The
judges too were the avowed enemies of the change.
The act was to go into effect on the 25th of March 1696. On
the 24th of March, Sir William Parkyns, a wealthy knight, bred
to the law, was put upon his trial for having been concerned with
Charnock, Porter, Goodman and Fenwick in a Jacobite plot to as-
sassinate the king. He prayed that counsel might be allowed him,
and cited the preamble of the statute as declaring that such a de-
mand was reasonable and just. Lord HOLT replied: "God forbid
that we should anticipate the operation of an Act of Parliament
even by a single day:" 13 State Trials 72. Parkyns then asked that
the trial be postponed; but his application was refused and the
unlucky man was actually convicted and executed six hours before
the bill went into effect.
It was a long time, however, before counsel were bold enough to
defend their clients with spirit, and it remained for Dunning and
the never to be daunted Erskine to establish the rights of the bar.
The first instance on record of the assignment of counsel under
the act is on the trial of Rookwood and others for having been
concerned in the same conspiracy as Parkyns. Sir Bartholomew
Shower was assigned as counsel. "My Lord," said he, addressing
Chief Justice HOLT, "we are assigned of counsel in pursuance of
an act of Parliament, and we hope that nothing which we shall say
in defence of our clients shall be imputed to ourselves. * * *
We come not here to countenance the practices for )yhich the
prisoners stand accused, nor the principles upon which such prac-
tices may be presumed to be founded; *for we know of none, either
religious or civil, that can warrant or excuse them." Lord HOLT
administered a very proper rebuke. 13 State Trials 154.
In strong contrast with this abject apology is the splendid bearing
of Erskine on the trial of Paine: "I will for ever-at all hazards-
assert the dignity, independence and integrity of the English bar,
without which impartial justice, the most valuable part of the Eng-
lish Constitution, can have no existence. From the moment that
any advocate can be permitted to say that he will or will not stand
between the crown and the subject arraigned in the court where
he daily sits to practice, from that moment, the liberties of England
are at an end."
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Impeachments had been expressly excepted from the Statute of
William, and, therefore, counsel were denied to Lords Winton
and Lovat, the latter of whom, broken by the weight of eighty
years, was too feeble to struggle even for his life. It is significant
that Sir William Yonge, who was the leading manager of their
impeachment, introduced into the House of Commons the bill that
in 1747 became known .as 20th Geo. II., correcting this abuse.
It was not until 1836 that the last remnants of this barbarism
were swept away. The 6 & 7 Wm. IV., c. 114, enacted that all
persons tried for felony should be admitted to make their defence
by counsel or attorney.
As the law now stands, the prisoner, for whatever crime
indicted, is entitled to the full assistance of counsel upon every
question of fact and law, to visit him in prison, to advise him in
court, to cross-examine the opposing witnesses, to examine in chief
those produced for the defence, and to address the jury. The
only remaining question is, how far does the representation by
counsel supplant the prisoner's ancient right to act in person ?
It was early held in England that a man could be heard by
himself or his counsel, but not by both. The point was raised
upon the trial of Mr. Redhead Yorke, in 1795, for a misdemeanor:
25 State Trials 1021. At the close of the opening by the counsel-
for the prosecution, Mr. Yorke applied to Justice ROOKE to learn
whether both himself and his counsel might address the jury. He
was informed that both could not, and that he must make his elec-
tion. Mr. Yorke then applied to be permittad, when his counsel
examined the witnesses, to examine them himself also. This was
refused. Mr. Yorke and his counsel then alternately cross-
examined. Then at the close of the prosecution the court asked
the prisoner whether he had elected to address the jury or to leave
it to his counsel. He elected to do it in person, and his counsel
and himself alternately examined the witnesses for the defence.
In 1811, Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in the case of Rex v. lhiite,°3
Camp. N. P. 98, still further restricted the practice. His lan-
guage is so clear and sensible as to deserve quotation: "1I am
afraid of the confusion and perplexity that would arise if a cause
vere to be conductel at the same time both by counsel and the
party himself. I am extremely anxious that a person accused
should have every assistance in making his defence, but I must
likewise look to the decent and orderly administration of justice.
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[ therefore cannot allow counsel to examine witnesses for the
defendant if he is likewise to put questions to them himself and
afterwards to address the jury. If, in the course of the trial, any
point of law arises which he declares himself incompetent to dis-
cuss, I will be very ready to hear it argued by his counsel,
although he conducts the defence himself. I will do in this
respect as was formerly done in capital cases when the assistance
of counsel was not permitted to prisoners upon matters of fact. I
think I cannot consistently with my duty go further; and surely
there is no hardship in the rule I lay down. If the defendant has
counsel to conduct his cause, he may suggest any question to them
which he considers fit to be put, or if he takes the conduct of it
up6n himself he may have the benefit of their private suggestions
upon matters of fact; and as soon as any point of law arises they
shall be readily heard upon it."
Both of these cases were cited in argument before Lord Chief
Justice ABBOTT on the trial of one Parkins for a misdemeanor;
he held that a prisoner cannot have counsel to examine and cross-
examine witnesses and reserve to himself the right to address the
jury: Rlex v. Parkins, Ryan & Moody N. P. C. 168.
An examination of the later decisions shows an occasional
departure, under very special circumstances, from the rulings just
quoted, but the undoubted weight of authority is in favor of the
rule, which very eminent judges have repeatedly enforced, that a
prisoner is in the hands of his counsel for every purpose, if he see
fit to employ counsel; but so tender is the law about infringe-
ments of ancient rights that on a murder trial of a foreigner who
had obstinately remained mute from malice for more than a year,
the court refused to allow counsel to appear for the prisoner with-
out his express consent: Regina v. Yscuado, 6 Cox C. 0. 386.
In the following cases the rule was enforced : Reg. v. 11fanzano,
2 Foster & F. 64; s. a. 6 Jur. N. S. 406; Beg. v. Taylor, 1
Foster & F. 535 ; Beg. v. fBouce er, 8 C. & P. 141; Req. v. Bur-
rows, 2 Al. & Rob. 124; Reg. v. Waljling, 8 C. & P. 243; Beg.
v. Rider, 8 Id: 539 ; Beg. v. Teste, 4 Jur. N. S. 244.
In the.following cases the rule was relaxed : Beg. v. Stephens,
11 Cox C. C. 669 ; Beg. v. yer, 1 Id. 113 ; Beg. v. iJHalings, 8
C. & P. 242 ; Queen v. Williams, I Cox C. C. 363.
We now turn to the United States, and must go .back in point
of time. The materials to furnish an accurate judgment of the
VoL. .80
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practice in the colonies prior to the Revolution are few and
unsatisfactory. The colonial charters and patents are silent as
to any change, real or proposed, of the law of the mother country,
but among the laws agreed upon in England between William
Penn and "divers free men of the Province" of Pennsylvania, the
sixth article provided that "in all courts all persons of all persua-
sions may freely appear in their own way and according to their
own manner, and there personally plead their own cause them-
selves, or, if unable, by their friend." Admonished, no doubt.
by his own sufferings, the liberal and benevolent Proprietary, in
the Charter of Privileges granted by him in 1701, with the appro-
bation of the General Assembly, declared, "that all criminals
shall have the same privileges of witnesses and counsel as their
prosecutors." The records of the Provincial Council show that
those accused of crime both defended themselves and were defended
by counsel; but we can only conjecture how the practice changed
in the other colonies.
In 1718, at Charleston, in South Carolina, Major Stede
Bonnet and thirty-three others were tried in the Vice Admiralty
Court for piracy: 15 State Trials 1231. The prisoners had no
counsel, and the behavior of Chief Justice TROTT is a sad
instance of judicial barbarity. The statements of the prisoners
in one case, to which no credit was given for their exculpation, were
used as hearsay evidence in another case to convict the prisoner.
In 1732 John Peter Zenger was tried in New York for libel,
and was defended with great boldness by Andrew Hamilton of
Philadelphia, the most eloquent and renowned lawyer of his day.
The case is no guide for us, however, as libel is graded as a misde-
mean w.
In 1770, Josiah Quincy, Jr., and John Adams defended, for the
murder of Attucks, Gray and others, the soldiers who had fired
upon The mob in the streets of Boston on the evening of the 5th
of March. These and the cases of the Salem witches are the only
trials of note that our meagre colonial records afford.
The example set by Penn and the sufferings of.the English at
home, full of instructive warning to those who sought to guard
against governmental tyranny by constitutional provisions, are
sufficient to account for the presence in the earliest state Constitu-
tions of a clause extending to one accused of crime the protection
of a defence by counsel.
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Pennsylvania and Maryland so provided in 1776 ; New York in
the following year; Massachusetts in 1780, and Delaware in 1792.
In September 1787, the convention called to frame the Constitution
of the United States completed their work, and submitted it to the
people for adoption. The original instrument contained no Bill of
Rights and no reference to our subject. At the end of July 1788,
eleven states had unconditionally adopted the Constitution, but five
of them proposed amendments for the consideration of the first
Congress that would assemble under it, and one of the five called
for a second general convention to act upon the amendments desired.
North Carolina and Rhode Island did not adopt the Constitution
until the administration of Washington had fairly begun, and by
the 15th of December 1791, amendments were duly proposed by
Congress and ratified by the legislatures of the several states. The
sixth amendment, to which alone we need refer, has been partly
quoted at the head of this article. To carry it into effect Congress
provided "that in all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance
of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts
respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein :" and further, at a later date, " every person * * * in-
dicted for treason or other capital offence shall be allowed to make
his full defence by counsel learned in the law :" Rev. Stat. U. S.
sects. 747, 1034. This language and that of the amendment to
the Constitution have never received judicial construction. The
practice, we believe, has been in conformity with the English rule,
until the recent trial of Guiteau. It is a singular fact that the
question has never been raised in any of the states, except in a
late case in Tennessee, which we shall presently notice.
In Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas, the language of the
constitutional clauses is too explicit to admit of doubt; it gives the
right "to be heard by himself or counsel, or both, as he may elect."
In Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin, the language is "by himself
and his counsel." In Kansas, Louisiana and Nebraska, it is "in
person or by counsel." In Alabama and Maine, it is "by himself
and his counsel or either at his election." In Massachusetts he "shall
be fully heard by himself or counsel, at his election." In California,
Florida, Nevada and New York, he is "to appear and defend in per-
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son and with counsel as in civil actions." In Georgia he "shall have
the privilege and benefit of counsel." InIowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island and West Virginia, "he
shall have the assistance of counsel in his defence." In Maryland
it is declared that "he ought to be allowed counsel." In Virginia
there is no constitutional provision, but a statute of 1786 and well-
settled practice establish the right.
Upon most of these clauses there is room for ingenuity of argu-
ment, but the almost total absence of judicial decisions is strong
evidence of the sensible determination of criminals to commit their
defences exclusively to professional hands. The only case revealed
by a diligent search is that of Tlilson v. The State, in Tennessee,
3 Heisk. 232. Counsel bad fully agreed upon the evidence, and
then the prisoner himself claimed the right to make a statement.
This was denied. The Court of Errors and Appeals held that the
right given by the Constitution, though in the words "to be heard
by himself and his counsel," simply meant the right to argue the
case upon the facts in evidence, and did not include a sworn or un-
sworn statement of facts not otherwise proved. Judge NELSON
dissented on the ground that this was a denial of right. It may,
therefore, be fairly said that the question is still open to debate.
The limitations put upon the rights of advocates, and, by par-
ity of reasoning, upon those who claim to act as their own advo-
cates, are such as grow out of the powers of a court to so superin-
tend the proceedings as to prevent a waste of time or breach of
decorum. But while insisting upon the existence of these powers,
judges have universally displayed the utmost reluctance to exercise
them. The right to "try men by the hour-glass" is declared dan-
gerous in the extreme: Hunt v. The State of Georgia, 49 Geo.
255: People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581 ; Cooley's Const. Lim. 336;
State v. Collins, 70 N. C. 241 ; Word's Case, 3 Leigh (Va.) 743 ;
Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263 ; E1ynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541.
Other difficulties may arise, as recent experience has shown, from
the rule that in cases of felony the record must show that the pris-
oner was personally present during every stage of the trial: Prine
v. The Commonwealth, 6 Harris 103. This rule'is not enforced in
cases of misdemeanor: United States v. Davis, 6 Blatch. C. C. R.
464.
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